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At the core of opposition to guideline sentencing
is the diminished role such systems give to offender
characteristics unrelated to the crime. While indeter-
minate sentencing systems typically allowed judges
and parole boards almost unlimited discretion in
determining whether and to what extent the indi-
vidual circumstances of offenders should affect
sentences imposed and served, guidelines have
drastically curtailed such discretion. The purpose of
this article is to describe how one state-Washing-
ton-addressed the policy dispute surrounding the
relevance of offender characteristics. Since sentenc-
ing is primarily a state issue, the benefits of
Brandeis's "laboratory" are available to those who
examine how various states have resolved this issue.
A. Initial Legislative Judgments
Sentencing reform in Washington began in the
mid-1970s as part of the national movement to
replace sentencing based on the "rehabilitative ideal"
with sentencing based on "just deserts." The argu-
ment of reformers in Washington mirrored the
national debate.1 They were sharply critical of
individualized sentencing based on personal charac-
teristics as severing the link of proportionality
between crime and punishment. They saw judicial
discretion with its resulting disparity as inconsistent
with the goal of just and deserved sentences. In
addition, they challenged the ability of judges to
diagnose the causes of crime and tailor sentences to
cure these causes.
The reformer's solution was a fundamental
change in which judicial discretion would be con-
fined within boundaries set by law. While the initial
proposal called for those boundaries to be determined
"by the nature of the particular crime and the
criminal history of the defendant,"2 it recognized the
necessity of discretion in individual cases.
Those committed to the existing sentencing
system countered each of the arguments. They
argued that the reformers' call for treating like cases
alike begged the question of what made cases alike;
that a just system of punishment must take into
account all the circumstances of an offender's life, not
just the narrow facts of crime and criminal history.
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They argued that denying judges the ability to take
full account of all the circumstances of an offender
would impoverish the sentencing process and result
in harsher sentences for those most deserving of
leniency, the truly disadvantaged. In their view the
problem of "just deserts in an unjust world" required
that all life circumstances of defendants be considered
in sentencing.
The debate continued until 1980 when a biparti-
san Select Committee of the House of Representatives
produced a comprehensive proposal. Adopted in
1981 with overwhelming bipartisan support, the
Sentencing Reform Act was both radical and complex.
Its complexity was dictated by the legislature's desire
to integrate the multiple-and inconsistent-tradi-
tional purposes of sentencing into a structure of
principled co-existence. Just deserts was the primary,
but not exclusive principle. The Act abolished parole
and established a sentencing system which "struc-
tures but does not eliminate discretionary decisions
affecting sentences."3 This was to be accomplished
through a structure that sought the right mix of rule
and discretion by confining discretion both by criteria
that justified its exercise and by limitations in its
scope. The legislature did not totally reject individual
factors unrelated to the crime. Instead, it restricted
them to prescribed areas where it believed them
relevant.
The legislature prescribed ranges determined by
the offense and the offender's convictions, past and
present, as the starting point in sentencing. Other
offender characteristics were deemed not relevant to
this initial determination. The legislature went on to
provide, however, that "[tihe court may impose any
sentence within the range that it deems appropriate,"4
and prohibited appellate review of sentences within
the range.- These provisions meant that judges could
continue their prior practice of considering individual
factors; but the degree to which those considerations
could influence the sentence was limited by the width
of the range, which the legislature restricted in
percentage terms.6 Thus, the legislature both affirmed
and confined the relevance of non-crime related
offender characteristics.
Recognizing the impossibility of designing
general rules to justly determine all individual cases,
the legislature made the ranges presumptive rather
than mandatory. Seeking a method to allow the
necessary individualization of sentences while
insuring consistency with the legislature's policy
judgments, the legislation authorized judges to depart
from the presumptive range when "substantial and
compelling reasons"7 existed. However, judges were
required to set forth reasons for the decision to depart
in written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
exceptional sentences were made subject to substan-
tive appellate review. Initially, the legislature did not
identify what types of factors it saw as "substantial
and compelling." It awaited recommendations from
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the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
Since it recognized that the strongest case for
sentencing based on individual characteristics was for
first offenders, the legislature created an optional
sentencing system for "first-time offenders"8 who
were being sentenced for their first non-violent felony
offense. Judges could either sentence eligible offend-
ers within the applicable sentence range or impose a
sentence similar to that authorized for probationary
sentences under Washington's former sentencing
system. The legislature was intentionally silent as to
the factors that should guide judges' discretion in
using this alternative and did not require judges to
state their reasons. In addition, it specifically
provided that first-time offender sentences were not
subject to appellate review9 because the legislature
believed that sentences for this class of offenders
should continue to be individualized to the particular
circumstances of each defendant. It confined the
impact of the discretion granted, however, by limiting
the length of confinement to a maximum of 90 days.
B. The Recommendations of the Guidelines
Commission
The Commission'0 worked from 1981 through
1983 on a series of recommendations to flesh out the
structure of the Act. All its recommendations were
adopted, including the three that are relevant to the
use of offender characteristics. First, the Commission
recommended a non-discrimination provision
providing that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines... will
apply equally to offenders in all parts of the state,
without regard to race, ethnicity, creed, gender,
sexual preference, or socio-economic status." How-
ever, legislative concern over some of the factors
resulted in the subsequent replacement of this
provision with a more general-and sweeping-
statement of purpose: "The sentencing guidelines...
apply equally to offenders in all parts of the state,
without discrimination as to any element that does
not relate to the crime or the previous record of the
defendant."" This re-affirmation of the primacy of
current and past crimes in determining sentences was
to influence the appellate courts as they undertook
the new task of substantively reviewing exceptional
sentences.
Secondly, the Commission developed a set of
aggravating and mitigating factors which it consid-
ered appropriate for exceptional sentences. While it
was careful to make explicit that the factors were
"illustrative only and are not intended to be exclusive
reasons for exceptional sentences,"' 2 only factors
relating to the crime were listed. Offender character-
istics unrelated to the crime were noticeably absent.
In one instance the Commission made its intent clear.
It included as a mitigating factor situations where
"[t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her
conduct to the requirements of the law was signifi-
cantly impaired" but stated that "voluntary use of
drugs or alcohol is excluded." 13 The legislature
adopted the recommended list without change, thus
reinforcing its original decision to make crime and
criminal history the primary factors and indicating
that other factors were relevant only where the
legislature deemed them to be. Exceptional sentences
were imposed in 3.5% of all sentences the first year
and have ranged between 3% and 4% of all sentences
ever since.
The third recommendation exemplified the
pragmatism which has characterized sentencing
reform in Washington from the beginning. Respond-
ing to concerns of victim advocates, judges and
treatment professionals, the Commission recom-
mended and the legislature adopted an optional
sentence for first-time sex offenders. Victim advo-
cates argued that presumptive prison sentences for
intra-family sexual abuse of children would discour-
age victims from reporting crimes and assisting in
their prosecution, and thus they favored an option
allowing community-based sentences requiring
treatment. Judges and treatment professionals
pointed to the compulsive nature of these crimes and
argued that without treatment these offenders would
continue their criminal conduct after release. The
Commission responded by crafting an optional
provision that allowed judges to suspend the
presumptive prison sentence conditioned in part
upon the offender's participation in sexual offender
treatment in the community. Before using this
alternative, the judge must consider an evaluation of
the offender's amenability to treatment and "deter-
mine whether the offender and the community will
benefit" from an alternative sentence. 1
No other restrictions were placed on the factors
the judge may consider, and no provision was made
for appellate review. Thus, just as with the first
offender provision, the legislature departed from the
desert-based principles that guided its reform when,
in its judgment, compelling considerations justified
continuing some features of the former sentencing
system. Nevertheless, the legislature carefully
limited the eligibility of offenders and imposed
restrictions on the nature and length of conditions of
the suspended sentence.
The combination of the first-time offender and
sex offender options meant that non crime-related
factors remained of major importance in a significant
number of sentencings. Initially 48% (3,844 of 7,961)
of all defendants were eligible for the first offender
option, and 47% (1,809 of 3,844) of those received an
optional sentence. Thus, 23% (1,809 of 7,961) of all
sentences were first-time offender option sentences,
although in nearly 80% of these sentences the
sentencing judge used only the power to impose
additional non-incarcerative conditions. The
confinement portion of these sentences was within
the standard sentence range. Similarly 36% of sex
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offenders (178 of 496) received optional sentences.
Thus, in the first year of the guidelines, 25% (1,987 of
7,961) of all sentences were optional sentences in
which individual characteristics of defendants could
have been determinative.
C. Subsequent Legislative Changes
The legislature has revisited the Sentencing
Reform Act every year since its adoption, but it has
never altered the basic structure of the Act or the
fundamental policy judgments on which it was
based. In 1987 it narrowed eligibility for the first time
offender option by excluding convictions for delivery
or possession with intent to deliver drugs, except
marijuana, regardless of quantity. This change
significantly reduced the number of first-time
offender sentences. In 1995 only 14% (2,958 of 21,421)
of all sentences were made pursuant to the first-time
offender option, a drop from 23% a decade earlier.
On the other hand, the legislature later continued its
pragmatic approach to categorical exceptions when it
authorized the department of corrections, on the
recommendation of the sentencing judge, to convert
certain short prison sentences for non-violent offenses
to "work ethic camp" sentences, 5 and when it
expanded the alternative sentence methodology of
the first-time offender and sex offender sentencing
alternatives to drug offenders who have no prior
felony convictions and whose offenses involve a
"small quantity" of drugs.' 6 While both of these
alternatives were carefully limited by eligibility
criteria, no restrictions were placed on the discretion
of the sentencing judge in determining whether or
not to use the alternative once the defendant is
statutorily eligible. Judges are not prohibited from
considering any information, including offender
characteristics, and no provision is made for appellate
review of these discretionary decisions.
Since its initial foray into sentencing guidelines,
the legislature has never varied its decision that the
primary factors which should determine sentence
ranges are crime and criminal history. The only
additions to the list of aggravating and mitigating
factors consisted of crime related factors.
D. Judicial Response
Judges in Washington, as most judges across the
nation, initially opposed the Sentencing Reform Act
and have continued to chafe under its restrictions.
Even though Washington's judges would not have
adopted the reform initially and would repeal it now,
by and large they have accepted the legislature's
primacy in establishing sentencing policy. Indicative
are statements such as "the presumptive ranges
established for each crime represent the Legislature's
judgment as to how best to accommodate" the
multiple purposes of sentencing17 and "[o]ur respon-
sibility is to apply the SRA as written."18 The
appellate courts, with one significant exception, have
read the Sentencing Reform Act to prohibit consider-
ation of offender characteristics where not expressly
or impliedly authorized by the legislature. Thus,
where a sentencing judge exercised the authority to
reduce the length of a standard range work release
sentence because the costs of the work release
program were threatening the defendant's ability to
maintain her business and pay restitution, a unani-
mous Washington Supreme Court held that no such
authority existed, stating "[w]e have allowed trial
court's discretion in sentencing only where the SRA
so authorized, and have crafted careful guidelines to
contain those limited circumstances." 9 Similarly
appellate courts have consistently rejected departures
from the standard range for offender characteristics
such as alcohol or drug dependence,20 educational
level,2' young age,22 good conduct following the
commission of the crime,
2 and parental status.24
While frequently expressing disagreement with
the legislature's policy judgments, the courts do not
see themselves as free to ignore those judgments.
Typical is this recent statement by a unanimous
Washington Supreme Court:
While we recognize the harshness of a rule that
precludes the trial court from considering a
defendant's altruistic past during the sentencing
phase, the... Act requires this result.... Al-
though sentencing within the standard range may
at times appear unnecessary or even unjustified, it
is the function of the judiciary to impose sentences
consistent with legislative enactment.25
Ironically, the one departure from this line of
cases authorized upward departures. It began with a
series of Court of Appeals decisions upholding such
departures from the standard range in sex offender
cases for "predicted future dangerousness" when that
prediction was based on "a history of similar acts or
other corroborating evidence." 26 Subsequent cases
required that the history of similar acts be accompa-
nied by evidence of lack of amenability to treatment.V
The Supreme Court approved exceptional sentences
for sex offenders based on future dangerousness
where the record contains "a history of similar acts of
sexual deviancy" and "the opinion of a mental health




The Supreme Court rejected an expansion of this
exception to non-sexual offense cases in which future
dangerousness had been relied upon to justify
exceptionally long sentences. After reviewing the
legislative history of sentencing reform in Washing-
ton, the court stated:
The extension of the future dangerousness factor
to non-sexual offense cases violates the certain
purpose of sentencing reform. It disrupts the
proportionality policy of imposing sentences in
accordance with the seriousness of the crime and
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the criminal record. Finally, it allows too broad a
grant of discretion to the sentencing judge, which
discretion the Legislature intended to limit.
29
The court juxtaposed this finding with its
continued approval of exceptional upward departures
for sex offenders based on their future dangerousness.
"Because the SRA distinguishes between sexual and
non-sexual offenses, there is authority for this court to
consider a defendant's amenability to treatment in
sexual offenders cases."" While this conclusion is a
doubtful reading of legislative intent,3 it significantly
limits the scope of the exception. In recent years
exceptional sentences for sex offenders have been
imposed in less than twenty cases per year.
With this single exception Washington's judges
have respected the allocation of powers to the
different branches of government and have been
faithful to the legislature's intent even though most of
them would have resolved many of the policy
issues-and specifically those regarding offender
characteristics--quite differently.
E. Conclusion
Whether Washington's resolution of the conten-
tious issue of the relevance of offender characteristics
to sentencing is correct is, of course, a subjective judg-
ment. It is, however, one way to resolve the tensions
inherent in crafting sentencing systems which incor-
porate multiple inconsistent purposes. The value of
examining the different resolutions of the same issue
in different jurisdictions is the insight gained from
examining what other "reasonable" people see as best
for them, at a given time. This report from
Washington's "laboratory" is offered in that spirit.
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crime itself or the defendant's criminal record. Therefore, it
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24 State v. Hodges, 70 W.App. 821, 825-6, 855 P.2d 291
(1993), rev. den. 124 Wn.2d 1013 (1994) ("The courts of this
state have consistently declined to impose exceptional
sentences below the standard range in the absence of factors
or circumstances related to the defendant's commission of a
crime that makes commission of the crime less egregious.
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great strides toward self-improvement, and is needed by
her children does not in any way distinguish her possession
and delivery of cocaine.... Clearly there was logic and
compassion in the sentencing approach taken by the trial
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upon to justify an exceptional sentence.").
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31 As a court of appeals judge, Mary Kay Becker, co-
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terized the approval of future dangerousness as a justifica-
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